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ABSTRACT   
 
Internationally, corruption in the planning, procurement, construction and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of infrastructure services (defined here as water supply, sanitation, 
drainage, access roads and paving, transport, solid waste management, street lighting and 
community buildings) has been recognised as a constraint to development. What progress 
has been made, therefore, in implementing greater accountability to combat corruption in 
the planning and delivery of infrastructure services?  This paper documents the growing 
interest (in developed and developing countries) in securing better governance for the 
delivery of infrastructure and assesses the potential of greater accountability to improve 
both provision and performance of infrastructure services.  
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Introduction  
 
The infrastructure sector has a world wide reputation for incidences of corruption, asset misappropriation 
and bribery. The term ‘infrastructure services’ cover a wide variety of activities but is defined here as those 
services derived from physical infrastructure networks or installations, including water supplies, sanitation, 
drainage, access roads and paving, street lighting, and solid waste management. The paper is structured as 
follows: Section 1 begins by describing and defining corruption. Section 2 moves on to examine how 
corruption affects the way infrastructure services are delivered in greater detail and gives examples of 
different types of corrupt practices which can take place during the various phases of infrastructure 
delivery.  Section 3 discusses how accountability can be operationalized in the context of infrastructure 
services. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that institutional reforms that seek to improve the 
relationships of accountability between stakeholders can reduce corruption, making it possible to construct, 
operate and maintain infrastructure on a more sustainable basis. This paper is based on a literature review 
and the initial findings of an on-going research project undertaken by the authors on anti-corruption 
practices for infrastructure services in a number of countries in South Asia, Southern Africa, UK, Central 
Eastern Europe and Latin America.  
 
Section 1: Corruption  
 
What is corruption?  
 
A general definition of corruption is the misuse of office for personal gain either at one’s own instigation or 
in response to inducements. Corruption can be ‘grand’ (involving large amounts of money and taking place 
at higher levels of society) or more commonly ‘petty’ (involving small amounts of money and which 
citizens may experience in their daily encounters with junior officials such as policemen). Various forms of 
corruption include:  
• Bribe - payments made in order to gain an advantage or to avoid a disadvantage, 
• Fraud - theft through misrepresentation,  
• Embezzlement - misappropriation of corporate or public funds,  
• Kickbacks -sweeteners or rewards for favourable decisions. 
 
Corruption can be ‘collusive’ (the willing and planned cooperation of the giver and taker), or ‘anticipatory’ 
(paying a bribe in anticipation of favourable actions or decisions from an authority) but can also be 
‘extortionary’ (forced extraction of bribes or other favours from vulnerable people by those in authority) 
(Davis, 2004). 
 
The literature describes the main causes of corruption as low salaries, a lack of morals, peer pressure, 
institutional cultures of corruption, the lack of accountability of public officials, poor law enforcement or 
lack of punishment of corrupt officials, and complex processes and regulations.  
 
Infrastructure, corruption and development  
 
Infrastructure services are central to the UN’s Millennium Development Goal of eradicating extreme 
poverty in two respects, as the motor of local economic growth and supporting sustainable livelihoods 
through equitable access to services; leading to increased employment, improved environments, better 
living standards, healthier people and lower infant mortality and promoting good governance.  
 
In the nineties, corruption became one of the focal points of the international development debate. 
Klitgaard (1988: 31) proposed that corruption might be an acceptable and normal means of obtaining 
routine low-level actions and/or approvals by officials. He suggested that corruption can in fact benefit 
private actors by putting “goods and services in the hands of people who value them the most, who use 
them the most”. Thus, corruption may benefit people by cutting red tape, making decision-making 
predictable, motivating underpaid workers and enabling some to obtain political power e.g. selling a vote 
for services. However, currently, there appears to be a consensus that corruption is harmful and that it has 
become increasingly unacceptable to a broad range of stakeholders, including businesses, governments, 
academics, and citizens. It is argued instead that corruption contributes is a significant barrier to economic, 
social and political development and poverty reduction. For example The Commission for Africa (2005) 
identified corruption as the single most important explanatory factor for the lack of economic development 
in Africa. 
 
Nevertheless, corruption is an international problem: the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index points to high levels of corruption in many highly industrialised, democratic countries as well as poor 
ones. Lewis (1996) notes corruption is typically viewed ethnocentrically: while western corruption is often 
interpreted as a one-off individual act, corruption in developing countries is typically seen as endemic and 
systematic. 
 
Section 2: Corruption in infrastructure services 
 
Some US $250 billion is spent annually on infrastructure in the developing world alone (Rodriguez, Waite, 
and Wolfe, 2005). However, worldwide, the sector is known for its association with corruption (DFID, 
2002). The 2005 edition of Transparency International's Global Corruption Report (Rodriguez, Waite & 
Wolfe, 2005) highlights the devastating impact of corruption in infrastructure (such as wasted tender 
expenses, tendering uncertainty, increased project costs, economic damage, blackmail, criminal 
prosecutions, fines, blacklisting, and brand damage and reputational risk). Corruption typically results in 
infrastructure projects which are unnecessary, unsuitable, defective or dangerous (Estache and Kouassi, 
2002; Shadrach & Ekeanyanwu, 2003).  
 
In developing countries corruption in infrastructure is of importance for poverty reduction strategies for 
two main reasons: firstly because it diverts resources away from the provision of public goods from social 
sectors that do not lend themselves to grand corruption, and towards large capital-intensive (non poverty-
focused) infrastructure projects and through limiting development, growth and poverty reduction and 
secondly through increasing the cost of public services, lowering their quality and often all together 
restricting poor people's access to such essential services as water and sanitation as the loss of revenue, 
diversion of public funds, and evasion of taxes associated with corruption mean that governments have less 
to spend on infrastructure (Deininger, 2003; Bo Dal & Rossi, 2004; DFID,2002).   
 Corruption in the industry often results from a combination of the highly competitive nature of the 
tendering process, a lack of transparent selection criteria for many projects, tight margins, close 
relationships between contractors, subcontractors and project owners, and cronyism in the industry 
(Stansbury, 2005; Rodriguez, Waite, and Wolfe, 2005, DFID, 2002). PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2003) 
Global Economic Crime Survey examined data from 184 construction companies in 44 countries around 
the world and found that corruption is currently a substantial threat, with one-third of those surveyed have 
experienced some form of economic crime. Corruption also represents a threat to those institutions 
companies which are financing, guaranteeing or insuring construction projects. Whilst, corruption might 
once have been viewed as a necessary requirement of doing business, yet is increasingly seen instead as a 
form of misconduct. For example, Britain banned U.K.-based companies from making facilitation 
payments as part of its 2002 anti-terrorism law and companies have established comprehensive anti-
corruption and bribery programs that include written policies, training, auditing and internal controls. 
 
Yet, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) found that corruption generates immense opportunities for payoffs 
with comparatively low risk of detection. This is a key problem in the infrastructure sector where 
incidences of corruption can be obscured by the complexity of projects, large number of small-scale 
contractors, delays and cost overruns, design changes and the fact that it is possible to conceal the quality 
of work (Stansbury, 2005; Rodriguez, Waite, and Wolfe, 2005, DFID, 2002).  
 
Table 1: Examples of corruption in the different stages of infrastructure delivery  
Stage of service 
delivery  
Examples  
Project selection  • Corruption can negatively affect the selection of projects. For example, corruption can divert resources 
away from social sectors and toward major infrastructure projects.  
• Corruption may also encourage the selection of uneconomical projects because of opportunities for 
financial kickbacks and political patronage. 
Planning stages • Project used as vote winners/opportunities for personal gain not on basis of priority/availability of 
financial resources. 
• Planning in favour of high value infrastructure (white elephant projects) and against the interest of the 
poor. 
• Project requirements may be overstated or tailored to fit one specific bidder. 
Inspection stages • Weak oversight and supervision mechanisms have been created that would prevent detection of fraud and 
corruption. 
• Kick-backs can be given to persuade inspectors to turn a blind eye to slow implementation of projects, 
unfulfilled contract requirements, and other instances of malpractice. 
Design  • Corrupt selection of consultants for feasibility studies, preparation of specifications/bid documents. 
• Over designed and overpriced projects to increase potential corrupt earnings during implementation.  
• Bribe for favourable environmental impact assessment/planning proposal/approval. 
• Project design has been manipulated to benefit particular suppliers, consultants, contractors, and other 
private parties. 
• The timing of the project has been altered to suit vested interests. 
Bid and contract 
signing stage  
 
• Political parties levy large rents on international businesses in return for government contracts.  
• Officials take percentages on government contracts. 
• Officials receive excessive “hospitality” from government contractors and benefits in kind.  
• Kickbacks for construction and supply contracts.  
• Lack of competitive/inequitable contract practices.  
• Inappropriate bidding procedures; excessively short bidding time or insufficient or inadequate advertising 
of tender.  
• Corrupt practice on the part of bidders (e.g. unjustified complaints, misleading bids etc). 
• Collusion among firms or between public officials and bidders. 
Construction  • Changing subcontract party after receiving bribes. 
• Cutting corners, ignoring rules, by passing procedures  
• Payment for equipment, materials or services which were not supplied. 
• The provision of equipment or goods of lower then specified quality (typical examples include lesser 
cement or steel reinforcements). 
• Concealing substandard work. 
• Bribe the relevant official to certify that the work was done according to specification. 
• Non-implementation.  
• Unjustified complaints from contractors as a way to obtain unjustified contract price increases. 
• Duplication of payments, alteration of invoices, lack of supporting records, ineligible payments, 
overbilling, misuse of funds (i.e. for purposes other than those aligned to project needs), misappropriation 
of discounts from suppliers/contractors, unauthorised payments etc.  
• Unauthorized use of project property. 
• Theft of materials, equipment or services. 
Service delivery  • Ghost/absent workers.  
• Siphoning off supplies to market.  
• Favouritism in hiring/promotions  
• Use of contacts/money to get better/faster service or to prevent delays. 
• Elite capture of infrastructure services. 
Maintenance and 
management stages  
 
• Corruption in procurement of equipment and spare parts.  
• Withholding needed approval/signatures of gifts/favours.  
• Corruption increases costs meaning lack of resources for O&M. 
• Bribes to win O&M contracts/ personnel appointments. 
• Lower standard of construction creates need for expensive repair and maintenance. 
 
Section 3: Accountability  
Accountability is a relationship between people. By way of general definition, Schedler, Diamond, Plattiner 
(1999; 17) state “A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions 
and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”. Accountability 
has two elements answerability (making power holders explain their actions) and enforceability (punishing 
poor performance) (Schedler, 1999). Accountability works by formalising expectations of action or 
behaviour, creating sanctions for failure, enabling trust, and providing the motivation and incentives to use 
resources efficiently and effectively (Cavill & Sohail, 2005). 
 
O’Donnel (in Schedler, Diamond, Plattiner, 1999; 2-3) makes the further distinction between the forms of 
accountability which operate in a horizontal or vertical direction.  For example, horizontal accountability 
includes legal accountability or administrative accountability, and is characterised by ‘the capacity of state 
institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government’.  Citizens have also been 
involved directly in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions, for example, in participatory 
evaluation of public spending:  Goetz and Jenkins (2001) call this diagonal or ‘hybrid accountability’. 
Vertical accountability can be achieved through fair elections, civil society activity, the media, public 
meetings, and formal grievances procedures.  However, commentators argue that too much accountability 
“can clog up the works, diverting resources and opening organisations to perverse pressures” (Considine, 
2002; 21).   
 
The complex nature of infrastructure services, asymmetries of information and expertise between provider 
and user involved mean that service providers have an incentive to engage in corrupt activities (Walsh, 
1995; 50).  Accountability improves infrastructure services principally in two ways:  
1. by making service providers explain and justify their actions against commonly agreed standards 
of effectiveness and  
2. the existence of sanctions for those found to have behaved immorally or performed ineffectively 
(Schedler in Schedler, Diamond, Plattiner, 1999; 16). 
 
The World Development Report (2004) has developed accountability as a way to promote pro-poor service 
delivery.  It conceives service delivery as a relationship between providers, clients and policy makers.  
Accountability can be differentiated into the short route, (the client can hold the provider directly 
accountable, without any intermediaries), and long route, (from citizen, to policymakers, to provider). 
Accountability to citizens is achieved when the state ensures that utilities, boards, and government 
departments provide efficient and equitable services for all citizens, including the poor.  
 
The potential of accountability to improve the outputs and sustainability of infrastructure services has been 
identified (World Bank, 2004).  The main reasons advanced for applying accountability to the delivery of 
infrastructure services can be summarised as: - 
• Reduce discretion: Discretion has the effect of introducing bias into service delivery, which may 
result in denying full service provision to certain people, or the selective provision of information. 
Increasing accountability for decisions and actions can reduce this discretion.  
• Improve information flows: Greater accountability can make information on the performance of 
services more widely available to service users, who are then equipped to ensure better quality and 
standards of service, and more effective use of resources.  
• Improve trust: The institutions traditionally responsible for service delivery have been accused of 
abusing the trust of citizens, for example, in their use of public money as well as their capacity for 
impartial and predictable provision of infrastructure services.  
• Compensate for weak political accountability: Democratic deficit, clientelistic politics and 
patronage in service delivery has weakened the voice of voters in service delivery.  Currently, 
attempts are being made to rework the relationships involved in service delivery, so that service 
providers are more directly accountable to service users.  
• Create demand for better services: Putting accountability arrangements in place can work to 
change levels of tolerance for poor service leading citizens to reveal their demand for better 
quality and more accountable infrastructure services.   
• Induce greater monitoring by service users: When citizens exert their influence over service 
providers it ensures that service providers (and policy makers) have the incentives to respond to 
their preferences. 
• Protect the socially and economically disadvantaged: As well as extending access to 
infrastructure services, greater accountability of service providers and policy makers can be used 
to protect the quality of supply available to marginal and excluded groups in society. 
• Improve public sector provision: Growing antipathy towards the provision of infrastructure 
services by a large, hierarchical, public sector has led to attempts to reduce and reorganise the 
public sector and improve the accountability of its activities.   
• Address fragmentation: In some countries, the for-profit private sector, non-government 
organisations, and community-based organisations, are key service providers.  Attention is being 
paid to the allocation of accountability in the context of fragmented service delivery.  
• Improve cost recovery: Greater accountability in the delivery of infrastructure services may have 
the consequence of improving cost recovery since service users may be more willing to pay for the 
services they receive.   
 
Institutions and Accountability  
The international development discourse has focused on improving institutions in recent years in order to 
improve per capita GDP growth. The literature describes the institutions that matter for development as 
property rights, civil liberties, political rights, democracy, as well as social clubs and associations. 
 
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints” (North, 1990), ‘complexes of norms and behaviours’ 
(Uphoff, 1986; 8-9), the social rules, conventions, and other elements of the structural framework of social 
interaction (Bardhan, 1989).  Institutions enforce of rules governing human behaviour and serve 
collectively valued purposes by reducing uncertainty, for example, by making information available, and 
making behaviour or another’s actions predictable.  Accountability operates as an institution by formalising 
expectations of action or behaviour, creating sanctions for failure, enabling trust, and providing the 
motivation and incentives to use resources efficiently and effectively.   
 
The literature typically uses the “principal agent” theory to analyse the problem of accountability for 
service provision.  This theory describes a relationship in which a principal, (service users in this case), 
attempts to secure services from an agent (service providers).  Agents are expected to be prone to moral 
hazard (Agents only pursue principal’s interests when they coincide with agent’s own interests) and hide 
the information that principals require to monitor their performance.  
 
In small face-to-face communities the transaction costs involved in monitoring service delivery would be 
less than in large scale urban societies.  This is because urban areas are characterised by more 
heterogeneity, impersonal exchange processes and uncertainty in social interactions.  All of which creates 
considerable scope for all kinds of opportunistic behaviour, (cheating, shirking, moral hazards) and leads to 
high transaction costs of monitoring.  Incentives are needed to induce agents to act in ways that deliver the 
desired type and level of performance to meet users needs, as well as reduce the costs of monitoring service 
delivery and disciplining service providers at the point of delivery. 
 
The theory of New Institutional Economics has been used to analyse and evaluate those institutions 
concerned with the provision of infrastructure services (Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne, 1993).  It is argued 
that public services have got the incentives wrong in the design, finance, construction, operation, 
maintenance and the use of facilities.  Service providers lack the incentives to prioritise the use of 
resources, to provide services for those in need, and users lack incentives to use services optimally (Reddy 
in Mwambu, 1995).  Another example is Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968), where a resource is 
overused because the resource is non excludable. Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993) conclude that 
market based incentives, for example, those associated with private property generate better use of 
resources and more effective and efficient service delivery, as well as ensure greater sustainability than 
those provided by the state.  
 
Institutional arrangements for infrastructure delivery  
 
The various institutional arrangements for delivering infrastructure services: 
• Private sector participation; has been used both an alternative financing mechanism and a way to 
improve the productivity, quality and cost effectiveness of services through changing the incentives 
operating in service delivery (For example commercial pressures, contracts, regulatory procedures, 
property rights and cost recovery are said to change incentives).   
• Government is the foremost provider of urban services; government finances 70% of infrastructure 
investment in Less Developed Countries (DFID, 2002; 2), and 90% of water systems worldwide are 
fully public utilities (The Economist, 2003; 5).  It is the responsibility of governments to provide, 
finance, regulate, and in other ways influence infrastructure services. They do it for three reasons: First, 
networked infrastructure services exhibit economies of scale, or network externalities, that make it 
technically more efficient to have a single distributor of the service. Second, governments often 
redistribute resources—such as a lifeline water subsidy— to ensure the minimum equitable service 
access that markets cannot.  Thirdly, citizens typically demand public sector involvement (provision, 
finance or regulation) through their votes.  
• NGOs are another key infrastructure provider in developing countries. NGO’s has a comparative 
advantage over the public sector in terms of flexibility, responsiveness, experimentation, motivation, 
and community participation. Community participation has been used to provide skills, resources, 
labour, and cost recovery in service delivery; in order to improve service levels, provide better channels 
of communication with provider agencies, more appropriate service delivery, better maintenance and 
more user-friendly procedures.  Common property theorists such as Ostrom (1996) established that 
local people, as well as governments, can successfully manage resources through various kinds of 
property regimes. 
• Households provide and maintain facilities which are self contained on the plot and are entirely the 
responsibility of the family. 
 
The World Development Report (World Bank, 1994) reached the broad conclusion that it is the institutions 
traditionally responsible for public service provision that are the cause of most unsatisfactory service.  By 
the early 1990’s, an international consensus had emerged which viewed state provision of services as 
expensive and unsustainable.  The inability of governments, particularly in Less Developed Countries, to 
provide, operate and maintain public services in pace with rapid urbanisation and population growth has 
been well documented.  It was argued that the role of government as direct providers of services has given 
rise to heavily subsidised, loss making utilities, operating to rigid rules with political interference.  This is 
said to create inefficient services that are unable to improve or expand.  Public Choice Theory has been 
used to further undermine the role of government in service delivery; it demonstrates that public officials 
would systematically benefit some economically powerful interest groups over others through public 
expenditures, goods, services and state regulations on the basis of self interest (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; 
25; Estache, 1994; Gelb, Knight and Sabot, 1991; 1186).  Politicians have also been criticised for 
clientelistic politics, capturing rents from urban services, and distributing them to their clients, for example, 
when the poor sell their vote in return for short term tangible needs such as basic services and land tenure 
(Beall, 1997; Moore and Putzel, 1999).   
 
The World Development Report (1994) made three recommendations for the reform of service delivery 
institutions: namely: 
1. the use of competition,  
2. application of commercial principles to service providers, and  
3. increased involvement of users in planning, operating, regulating and financing services.  
 
Infrastructure is said to have become inoperable due to weak institutions and structures of government.  
Proposed institutional solutions include civil service reform, privatization, democratization, 
decentralization, contracting out, provision through NGOs, empowerment, participatory methods, social 
funds, community-driven development, and user associations. Ten years on, the World Development 
Report (World Bank, 2004) returned to the theme of getting the institutions of infrastructure provision right 
through accountability.  Making services work requires improving the institutional arrangements for 
producing them as well as changing the institutional relationships among key actors (service beneficiaries, 
the state and providers). Accountability is claimed to be enhanced by the introduction of competition in 
service delivery through a clear split of responsibility for policy definition, service provision and 
monitoring. It is hypothesised that successful services for poor people emerge from institutional 
relationships in which the actors are accountable to each other. Donors and financial institutions have tried 
to reform institutions through conditionality as part of economic adjustment.   
 There is a tendency to suggest that the adequacy of infrastructure depends, to a great extent, on a well 
functioning liberal democracy. This is thought to require certain types of institution (capitalist institutions, 
parliamentary democracy, property rights, human rights, free markets and good governance).  This agenda 
the transfer of western liberal democratic ideals of individual freedom, equity, efficiency, legitimacy, 
representation and accountability in isolation from a country’s history, cultural tradition of politics or 
political culture.   
 
Section 4: Anti-corruption institutions for infrastructure delivery  
Curtailing corruption requires a multi-pronged strategy that addresses a number of concerns. Accountability 
initiatives of relevance to combating corruption in the infrastructure sector tend to include five important 
institutions: institutional restraints; citizens voice; institutional framework for monitoring; infrastructure of 
non-governmental anti-corruption organizations; and institutions supporting freedom of information.  
 
Institutional restraints  
Institutional restraints on corruption include an independent and effective judiciary, parliamentary 
oversight, courts, ombudsman, anticorruption commissions and other watchdog enforcement agencies as 
well as other forms of prosecution and enforcement. Tough sanctions are needed against companies caught 
bribing, including forfeiture of the contract and blacklisting from future bidding. There are a variety of anti-
corruption conventions and treaties in place designed to lower levels of corruption. For example the U.S., 
European and Latin American countries have brought their criminal codes into line with the provisions of 
the OECD Convention Against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(1997), enacting stiff criminal and civil penalties and removing tax deductions previously offered for 
payment of bribes. Anti Corruption Commissions receive and investigate allegations of mal-administration, 
including issues of corruption and lack of accountability and transparency. There are very few examples of 
successful independent anti-corruption commissions. Often cited are the experiences of Hong Kong 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Central Vigilance Commission India; Singapore 
Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau (CIPB). The Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(KICAC) and Botswana Directorate for Economic Crime and Corruption (DCEC) In particular, progress 
has been made in recognising the problem of corruption by both multilateral development banks and export 
credit agencies. The World Bank includes fraud and corruption provisions in its procurement and 
consultants guidelines; companies found to have violated the provisions are placed on a public blacklist that 
is used by the World Bank and some credit agencies when considering loans and contracts. Nearly 70 firms 
have been permanently banned in this way from competing for World Bank contracts. Regional 
development banks have taken a similar approach.  
 
A key institutional restraint adopted by service delivery organizations is the code of conduct. South Korea 
has adopted a Code of Conduct for Maintaining the Integrity of Public Officials. This code specifies the 
standards of conduct to be observed by both state and local public officials. It covers areas related to the 
prevention of conflict of interest, the prohibition to use public office for private purposes, the obligation of 
neutrality and impartiality and regulates the legitimate acceptance of gifts. Reports suggest that, since the 
code came into force, the number of duty-related offerings of gifts and hospitality have reduced 
substantially. However, it is not possible to prescribe exhaustive guidelines to cover each and every single 
ethical concern that employees are likely to face in their work. Today, a growing number of companies are 
designing programs that give employees a level of ethical understanding that allows them to make 
appropriate decisions.  
 
Citizen Voice 
Contemporary innovations in accountability rely on the voice and participation of service users in 
policymaking, planning, operating, regulating and financing infrastructure delivery. The involvement of 
citizens in promoting accountability compensates for weak government institutions and regulation by 
exposing professionals to the choice of consumers in a direct way.  This model in effect breaks up 
hierarchical accountability of traditional Weberian bureaucracy, (i.e. reporting up the line to the senior 
officers and politicians) and replaces it with direct accountability of service providers to communities. 
Putnam (1993) argues, “Engaged citizens are a source of discipline and information for public agencies”.  
In her study of Ceara, Brazil, Tendler (1997) examines how health workers were made accountable and 
self-regulating outside their agency through monitoring by the communities.  Lam (1996) also highlights 
the ‘social embeddedness’ of irrigation officials in the local community and the importance of daily 
informal social interaction between farmers and officials.  Social embeddedness creates a social pressure to 
do a good job, so that any wrongdoing on their part that causes harm to the local community could lead to 
social ostracism. If the poor have a say in service delivery they would be more likely to get access to 
affordable and appropriate services – either directly or via government. Informed citizen action and 
political activism is thought to require community institutions, cultural norms (e.g., women’s status) and 
social capital, information, perceived rights, and literacy as well as legal protection.  Abers (1998) 
documented the use of participatory budgeting in Brazil for the scrutiny of past year expenditure, to set 
spending priorities and allocate funds for public investments.  This approach has been particularly useful in 
increasing transparency, reducing clientelistic relations, and securing better services in the favelas.  As a 
result corruption has fallen and services are delivered more efficiently. Success is associated with higher 
stocks social capital and communities with less economic inequality and less social and ethnic 
heterogeneity (Olson, 1965) in order to help overcome the collective action problem underlying voice, 
particularly for poor people. Ostrom (1996) has described instances of successful common property 
management by communities.  She found that reducing the costs and uncertainties of taking part in 
collective action would decrease the incentive for free riding, cheating, shirking and rent seeking. 
 
The institutional framework for monitoring  
Citizens have been directly involved in fighting corruption by monitoring their infrastructure delivery. 
Service users are considered best placed to monitor the services on which they depend, due to greater 
incentives and information, as well as the possibility of face-to-face interaction with frontline providers. In 
the Philippines, an NGO called Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) trains 
community beneficiaries to conduct audits and monitor project implementation in order to reduce 
corruption in the construction of public works. Community-based audits have been conducted where 
corruption is suspected in the delivery of public works have been organised in slum areas of Delhi by an 
NGO called Parivartan using Right to Information Law (RTI) to access records of public works. Paul 
(1992) has demonstrated how organised public feedback in the form of report cards can be used to 
challenge service providers to be more efficient and responsive to consumers.  Transparency International 
Bangladesh created grassroots pressure groups called Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) to 
promote integrity and curb corruption in public sector service delivery systems in selected sites of 
Bangladesh through grassroots participation of the recipients of public services. The ‘Corruption Report 
Card to the Mayor’ was initiated in Seoul in 1999. Officers in charge of civil affairs and citizens who have 
submitted a civil application/signed a contract with Seoul Metropolitan Government in a corruption prone 
area receive a postcard which they mail back if they have experienced wrongdoing in their dealings. Upon 
receiving a report card, the Mayor orders an investigation of the reported cases and if corruption has been 
proven, the Mayor issues appropriate punitive measures, and a reward to the person who reported the 
problem. The Kenya Urban Bribery Survey is used to assess corrupt practices in urban areas and thereby 
help inform strategies to increase transparency and accountability at the local level. 
 
Infrastructure of non-governmental anti-corruption organizations 
Various global non-governmental anti-corruption organizations have a major role in curbing corruption in 
the sector; for example Transparency International has developed Minimum Standards for Public 
Contracting provides a global baseline for public contracting rules that meet minimum international 
standards; Transparent Agents and Contracting Entities vets, certifies, and trains intermediaries such as 
consultants, brokers, sponsors, agents; Publish What You Pay calls for business to release information 
about all payments made to governments to ensure the funds benefit the public rather than corrupt 
bureaucrats or politicians. Trade or professional association governs the industry that grant professional 
status to members have a key role in making judgements about the acceptability of conduct on the basis of 
peer judgment. However reported cases of professional misconduct in relation to corruption are rare. 
Professional associations are often a source of pressure for major innovations. Professionals can be 
champions for reform, putting pressures on politicians and policymakers for reform. 
 
Transparency International advocates the use of an Integrity Pact, which commits the authority and bidding 
companies to refrain from bribery. The Integrity Pact is a tool that has already been successful in reducing 
corruption and cutting the costs of dozens of procurement procedures around the world, for example it has 
been used successfully in Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, and in Colombia by the local TI National Chapters. 
Most recently Integrity Pacts are to be used in the EUR 2 billion development of the Berlin-Brandenburg 
International Airport in Germany. TI Argentina (Poder Ciudadano) has adapted the Integrity Pact to include 
public hearings where municipal authorities convene citizens, businesses, experts, and representatives of 
the opposition to express their objections and suggestions about the planned terms of the contracting. 
Individual, company or industry-specific codes of business conduct and professional standards are also key 
in corruption prevention. 
 
Recently, there have been a number of initiatives intended to build awareness and dialogue within the 
private sector on good business practices, transparency, and accountability for those training and working 
in the construction industry. The Wolfsberg Principles is an effort by private companies to fight corruption 
by practicing sound business and accepting to submit their social and ethical performance to public 
monitoring and scrutiny (corporate accountability). Business Principles for the Construction Sector is 
endorsed by 19 leading international construction firms with annual revenues in excess of $70 billion (the 
initiative has been facilitated by the WEF, Transparency International and the Basel Institute on 
Governance) to bolster transparent and ethical business conduct in the industry. An organization which 
adopts the Business Principles commits: to adopt a "zero tolerance" policy on bribery; development of a 
practical and effective program of internal systems and controls for implementing its anti-bribery policy. 
 
Institutions supporting freedom of information  
Access to information is one of the most effective tools to curb corruption; greater transparency can make a 
significant contribution to reducing corruption and embezzlement. In the case of education, Anderson et al 
(2003) found that publicizing the amounts of school grants greatly increased parents’ and others’ ability to 
monitor local officials handling of the funds and led to massive improvements in the share of the funds 
reaching the schools.  Public disclosure laws such as The Right to Information Legislation and public 
hearings have been used to audit government budgets in India (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001). A grassroots 
organisation called Mazdoor Kisan Shakthi Sangathan (MKSS), has triggered civic action against 
corruption in the public sector by raising citizens' awareness of the goods and services they should receive 
and confronting local politicians with discrepancies between policy statements and actual delivery. 
Participatory public expenditure tracking surveys were carried out in Uganda (1996) to find out why 
Structural Adjustment Programmes specifically supporting spending on basic services had not improved 
development outcomes of service delivery.  TI Serbia developed the programme “Towards More 
Transparent Budgeting and Public Procurement in Municipalities in Serbia” in order to increase the 
efficiency and quality of municipal services, to improve communication and relations between the 
municipal administration and citizens and to establish a more efficient and transparent budgeting and public 
procurement system (Steets, 2001). 
 
An effective media can do much to disseminate information about corruption in the construction sector 
informing both the public and policymakers and prompting investigations by official bodies. Transparency 
International Bangladesh (TIB) developed the 'News Scan Database', a database of corruption stories from 
newspaper archives. This tool is intended not only to measure the nature and extent of corruption in 
Bangladesh, but also to encourage the media to further investigate and report instances of corruption. 
Thailand (TT) produced a series of radio shows (in Bangkok and more remote and rural areas of Thailand) 
dealing with the problems of corruption and the lack of transparency in government and business circles. 
 
www.licitenet.com is an online database created to inform the public about the process of public 
procurement in Ecuador. It is a joint initiative between the private sector and civil society to create more 
transparency within public procurement, to allow the public to follow and monitor procurement of 
relevance to their community and to decrease the discretionary powers of public officials in this area. E-
procurement has been recognized the world over as an important instrument for checking corruption and 
misuse of power. An e-procurement system was introduced in the Republic of Korea in 1998 for 
purchasing goods and services and arranging contracts for construction projects. All procurement from 
purchase requests to electronic tendering, and payment is processed on line. Automation has simplified the 
bidding procedure, improved competition, avoided preferential treatment, and eliminated non-arbitrary 
behaviour. 
 Conclusions  
 
This paper has described and defined corruption, examined how corruption affects the way infrastructure 
services and discussed how accountability can be operationalized in the context of infrastructure services. 
Many successful institutional innovations, that seek to improve the relationships of accountability between 
the main actors (service beneficiaries, the state, and providers), show clearly how corruption can be 
combated in the delivery of infrastructure services worldwide, making it possible to construct, operate and 
maintain infrastructure on a more sustainable basis. 
 
Multiple institutional channels of accountability have been discussed in this paper— institutional restraints 
(independent and effective judiciary, parliamentary oversight, courts, ombudsman, anticorruption 
commissions and other watchdog enforcement agencies as well as other forms of prosecution and 
enforcement); citizens voice (community level institutions, shaped by cultural norms and practices, can 
facilitate improved outcomes for the infrastructure sector and improve services for the poor); institutional 
framework for monitoring (citizens monitoring their infrastructure delivery); infrastructure of non-
governmental anti-corruption organizations (such as Transparency International, Publish What You Pay, 
Transparent Agents and Contracting Entities as well as professional bodies and private sector initiatives) ; 
and institutions supporting freedom of information (public disclosure laws, the media and Information 
Communication Technologies).  
 
Institutional reforms, particularly those based on grassroots public action1, change power relationships 
among actors and as such they are political reforms. Thus, institutional reform is risky, “a threat to 
powerful vested interests” (Freire, 1972); it is aimed at transforming the political and social structures that 
reproduce, or advance certain interests.  White (1996; 14) recognised that if the voiceless gain a voice it 
should threaten the status quo and those who benefit from it, and this would be expected to bring conflict in 
                                                 
1 Grassroots public action in the process of social change might be either collaborative, whereby people 
support government actions, or adversarial, where public demands initiate services (Dreze and Sen, 1989; 
259). 
society.  Although conflict from institutional change is not inevitable; Sen (1992; 275) proposes the co-
production of accountable public services whereby, “we can think of people participating along with 
governments in defining needs, in making choices appropriate to those needs, and in enforcing 
accountability.”    
 
Thus, in conclusion, just as multiple institutional channels of accountability are required to combat 
corruption in the infrastructure sector, there is also the need for co-production by the main stakeholders2 
(service beneficiaries, the state, and providers) if they are to secure better governance for the delivery of 
infrastructure and to improve both provision and performance of infrastructure services. 
 
                                                 
2 linked by relationships of accountability 
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